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PERSPECTIVE OF THE PRIVATE SECTOR-BANKING
F. William Hawley*
I guess I am one of those industries that Mr. Ascher was referring
to as having put all the heat on Government to finally recognize
the importance of some of these issues. I have to plead guilty to
having been involved in this effort for some time. In response to
Professor Wilner's comment "why now?" or "why is the timing
so urgent?", my immediate reaction is that we have not only the
culmination of a process that has been going on for some time as
Mr. Ascher mentioned, but also there is an important conjuncture
here with technological advancements, particularly in the telecommunications and related fields that Mr. Aronson will discuss. These
services are the lifeblood of the international financial system.
Instantaneous-transfers of funds and other transactional communications through that network around the world have brought
about a globalization of the system. This makes it especially urgent
that we recognize that we are living in an instantaneous transaction
type of global system which requires global multilateral rules. It is
high time that we face the questions that are implied in that recognition.
From the viewpoint of the banking system, why are we concerned,
and what kinds of barriers do we face around the world? Let me
give a couple of examples from among the many countries that
impose a wide range of barriers to their markets. Some do not
allow any foreign bank to be represented (or at least no new entries
from abroad) in their home markets. Other countries, some of
which are in Europe, until recently would allow a subsidiary but
not a branch of a bank, so that transactions were limited by capital
restraints on subsidiaries and other rules. Other countries will allow
both subsidiaries and branches of foreign banks, but will not allow
them to fund themselves by issuing certificates of deposit or by
having access to the discount window of the central bank or to
other means of funding. They will put very difficult restraints on
the ability of the bank to offer a wide range of financial services
within the community so that the local banking operators are protected in the market that they prefer to dominate. Finally, there
are countries that are wide open to foreign competition because
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their governments have recognized the advantages that can accrue
to the domestic economy from offering a more competitive array
of financial services to the manufacturing and other sectors in the
economy. So we have a wide range of concerns from our industry's
standpoint.
Until recently, I would have put Europe in the category of the
countries that allow virtually unrestricted access, but now we have
some worries about this very fashionable topic of "EC 1992". This
is obviously of particular interest to your profession, because there
seems to be a conference organized by a legal organization almost
every 48 hours that you can attend for $450. I welcome you all to
that competitive activity. But "EC 1992" does present an important
challenge, and it raises some questions which as recently as two or
three years ago we would not have felt worth even mentioning. We
now face not the restrictions of the types I mentioned in (predominantly) the Third World, but we face the prospect of a marketclosing operation in certain sectors in Europe under the terms of
the banking and securities directives that I will refer to later.
Now let me make a couple of general points on the importance
of the GATT negotiations. The "Uruguay Round" must address
the problems that I outlined, and it offers a tremendous opportunity; however, there are some serious problems, and there is some
serious resistance to going the route that we are advocating. I will
explain what some of the sensitivities are and how we are trying
to overcome them.
The agreement is important to all parties. It is important to the
U.S. private sector and to the private sector of other countries
because most economies throughout the world, certainly in the
industrialized world but increasingly in the Third World, are made
up predominantly of the service sector. The welfare, per capita
income and living standards of all economies will increasingly depend on our ability to deal in a public policy sense with the
implications of the growing role of the service sector.
The rest of the economy, in turn, is importantly dependent on
the functioning of the service sector of the economy. As you study
the trend of the evolution of manufacturing, you run across the
phenomenon of the "dematerialization of product": less and less
of the value of a product reflects the raw materials that are in the
product, and more and more is dependent on the service content
of the product, the design, the marketing, the financial packages,
the transportation, etc. So the inter-relationships here are very
important.
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The urgency was stressed recently in a statement that has lessons
for all of us. In Australia, at a recent conference that I addressed,
a friend of mine representing the Japanese Kaidanren gave a presentation on the importance Japan attaches to reaching an agreement
on trade in service. His explanation was that the inter-relationship
between the various parts of the service sector and the manufacturing sector is so complex and so important that Japan risks losing
its competitive edge in the manufacturing sector because of retarded
competitiveness in the service sector. It seems to me if that is
important to, and recognized as important by, the Japanese, then
that must be important for the rest of the world. There is a lesson
in that, both for the United States and also for the developing
countries concerned with the development process. The developmental studies done by the UNCTAD have also recognized this
inter-relationship, and the increased importance and urgency of
formulating sound policies related to the service sector of the economy.
Where UNCTAD still differs with my reasoning is at the fork
in the road that determines trade policy. All too often, I feel that
the UNCTAD economists are advocating a line that says "yes, this
is important,-in fact it is so important that we have to build a
wall around it and protect it from international competition." So
we still have our differences. I would argue much more strongly
that the past models of development based on import substitution
and infant industry strategies have been disappointing to all observers, including the inhabitants of the countries that have followed
those models. Today, increasingly in the discipline of economics
as well as in the political structures of the Third World, people
are recognizing these realities and are moving more to the open
economy model. So I see some hope that we are moving into an
environment in which we can get some mutual recognition of the
advantages of increased international competition and the lowering
of barriers.
Services differ from manufacturing in one important respect-a
key point for the type of negotiation that we are talking about
here. In manufacturing, a product coming into your country from
abroad stimulates economic activity primarily in the country where
the good was manufactured. In the services sector in general, and
certainly in financial services, it is the recipient economy which
gets the added stimulus because service providers typically establish
a physical presence within that country's market, providing employment to local workers, training, and technology transfer. This
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is another important reason why we feel that a lowering of barriers
in this area constitutes an important contribution to the development
process. Technology transfer, stimulation of employment, and training occur naturally, as essential ingredients in the way service companies have to do their business. There is no way that a bank can
successfully operate by parachuting one hundred Yale or Princeton
graduates into Egypt and asking them to successfully operate a
bank. There is no way to do that. We are hiring locally, we are
training locally, we are promoting locally; it is the only way these
companies can successfully operate.
I would like to make a couple of comments on the objectives
that we seek. It is going to be difficult to deal with a regulated
industry such as banking, because you do have some special concerns
there that relate to safety and soundness. It is no simple matter
for the Treasury Department and the Federal Reserve Board in
Washington to sign on to an international negotiation affecting
their responsibility to protect the safety and soundness of our
banking system. So this is one aspect of the service negotiations
that is going to require some work. This is also an important issue
for the Third World-the implications of lowering barriers and
welcoming more investment and trade in services for their own
control over their economy, and their ability to run their own
economy in the way that they feel is appropriate. Our answer to
this is that the objective we are seeking in the framework agreement
is not based on trying to get everybody to have the same regulatory
system that we have and to mirror the Federal Reserve system or
any other system. God help any country that would take on the
Glass-Steagall Act and our interstate banking restrictions. We are
not trying to push anybody to go to our model or to any other
standard model.
The reason we have advocated the "national treatment" approach
is precisely because it offers every country the flexibility to tailor
its own regulaiory system to its own needs. All we are asking is
that they apply the same criteria to the foreign institutions that
they do to the domestic ones. This approach gives them all the
protection they need in the "safety and soundness" area, but allows
them to get the benefit of the competitive process in upgrading the
quality of their financial system. Because of the inter-relationships
I mentioned before, these countries will get benefits for the other
sectors of the economy as well. We feel that this is an important
ingredient in the negotiations, and I will get back to this because
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there are some challenges to this that are beginning to emerge. The
national treatment approach allows flexibility.
Some people, including government officials, have asked me
whether I really want to get the banking sector involved in the
international trade negotiations, in view of the difficulties some
American banks may have in competing with the foreign banks if
they all come into the U.S. and compete in our markets. I point
out that, since the enactment of the International Banking Act in
1978, "national treatment" has been the official U.S. policy. Every
foreign bank that wants to operate in the United States and that
has a serious interest in operating here is already here. There is no
reason why they cannot be. They have to face the same restrictions
that we do once they are here. Once they have picked a home state
to operate out of, usually New York, California or Illinois, they
face the same restrictions that domestic banks do in crossing state
lines and in moving beyond straight commercial banking and into
securities and other businesses.
Since national treatment is already the official policy of the United
States, another difficulty we face in the negotiations is that we
have "given away the store". We have opened our economy wide
to the rest of the world's banking systems and from that position
we are looking for the leverage that will allow the lowering of
barriers abroad.
It obviously creates some complication when one talks only within
that one sector of how to accomplish what we would like to see
accomplished and what we feel is to everyone's mutual benefit.
This is obviously another reason why we favor a very broad negotiation that covers many sectors and many types of problems so
that in the final cost-benefit mix we can find some progress in
what we feel is an essential sector for all participants.
Let me mention one emerging problem, because I promised to
get back to it when I talked about the challenge to national treatment. Mr. Hunnicutt concluded with the statement, "In the Uruguay Round as well as in policies for post Uruguay, the underlying
principles of GATT which are still the foundation on which trade
liberalization is founded-non-discrimination, transparency, and
reciprocity-should remain our guides." This is quite accurate in
the way that he has intended it, but I circled the word "reciprocity"
because, as many of you are aware, the word is one that is used
by trade negotiators in at least two very different senses. The classic
sense in which the Americans as well as other nationalities who
created the GATT system used the word reciprocity is a very dif-
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ferent sense from that in which the European Community is beginning to use it now as they draft the directives that make up the
internal market program for 1992.
The Europeans appear to be moving toward a strict bilateral
sectoral reciprocity approach which could destroy not only our
hopes of getting a more sane world regime in the financial sector
but could also put a serious road block in the way of the entire
Uruguay Round process.' The Europeans are saying that they are
not going to define equal treatment or fair treatment as it would
exist under a "national treatment" approach- where you are comparing within the same marketplace what the foreign institutions
and domestic institutions receive in terms of regulatory treatment
and access to the marketplace-but rather they are going to use a
very different comparison. They are going to compare what foreign
companies receive in terms of treatment in their market versus what
treatment their companies receive in the foreign market, and if they
are not the same, the EC is going to threaten to close down access
to their markets. They view this stategy as useful leverage, as a
market-opening wrench. However commendable their intentions
are-to use this as a market opener particularly directed against
the Glass Steagall Act in the United States and against our interstate
banking restrictions-given the political realities in this country that
we have been struggling with for 50 years on some of these subjects,
it is extremely unlikely that this strategy will lead to the results
that are intended. The results that are more likely to occur are a
forced closing of a part of our access to the European market.
This would have broader consequences than simply blocking our
access to the European banking, investment and insurance markets.
Moving to a "reciprocity" strategy could cripple the Uruguay Round
negotiations on services. Every developing country needs some flexibility to design its own regulatory system to meet its own circumstances. Those needs can only be met by going forward with more
of a "national treatment" approach. We want them to treat foreign
and domestic companies in their market similarly, and give them
the same competitive opportunity within their market. We are not
going to ask developing countries to mirror the systems that the

I Subsequent to the Trade Conference, the EEC adopted modifications of its
Second Banking Directive which have allayed the concerns of many-including Mr.
Hawley-about the EC's "reciprocity" approach discussed here by Mr. Hawley.
-Ed.
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United States or the Europeans have, which is one of the implications of the reciprocity approach. Therefore, the Europeans are
risking adopting a process that will inevitably lead them to close
down some of their own markets to us in terms of the breadth of
financial services that can be offered. The European position might
also cripple our abilities to reach an agreement with important
Third World markets that are looking for the flexibility inherent
in the "national treatment" approach rather than the rigid harmonization implications of the "reciprocity" approach. This issue
is becoming more important as we follow the discussions in Geneva
with the Third World.

